When telco wallet is a trap, not a strategy

Three numbers

Any conversation about wallet has to start with three numbers. Frequency: how many times per month a customer opens the wallet. Merchant network: how many points accept payment. Take rate: what share the operator keeps from each transaction.

In working telco wallet models around the world, the numbers look like this. M-Pesa in Kenya: 8-15 transactions per user per month, 100,000+ acceptance points, take rate 0.5-1.5%. GCash in the Philippines: 12-18 transactions, 2.5 million merchants, take rate 0.3-0.8%. Orange Money in Africa: 6-10 transactions, specific network, take rate 1-2%. STC Pay in Saudi Arabia: 15+ transactions, the SNB bank ecosystem, variable take rate.

Most telecom operators that launch a wallet calculate frequency and merchant network as a proportion of their subscriber base. That is the mistake. Base size by itself does not produce adoption. The three numbers above matter much more.

What the conditions are in Uzbekistan

The payment landscape in Uzbekistan is more complex than it looks from the outside. The Central Bank registry lists dozens of payment organisations (cbu.uz/payment-organizations). Click handles a substantial volume of payments through merchants and P2P. Payme leads on integrations and UX. Apelsin and Uzum operate in e-commerce and retail. Anor, Tenge24 — niche products.

For a wallet newcomer the situation is this. The “default mobile wallet” slot is already taken by Click and Payme. They already have merchant network, frequency and brand recognition among youth and the middle class. Launching another wallet means competing in an established category, which is significantly more expensive than creating a new one.

This contrasts with markets where telco wallet took off. M-Pesa appeared in Kenya when banks covered 20% of the population and there was no alternative. GCash appeared before banks rolled out digital. Uzbekistan is not a young payments market — it is a market with established fintech players.

This does not mean wallet does not make sense. It means the approach has to be different.

Three wallet types and their economics

Type A: full custody wallet with a licence. The operator gets a payment organisation licence, holds the customer’s balance itself, runs P2P, merchants, top-up, payouts. Regulatorily heavy — compliance, AML, KYC, financial reporting. Capex 3-5 million dollars at launch, 12-18 months for the licence plus build, 18-24 months to break-even under an optimistic scenario. Pays back at 10+ transactions per user per month and a merchant network of 30,000+. Worth starting only if the operator is ready to invest in fintech as a separate business unit with its own P&L.

Type B: partner wallet (white-label on the infrastructure of a bank or payment organisation). The operator owns the UX, the base, the marketing. Money, compliance and settlement sit with the partner. The operator gets a revenue share on transactions. Capex significantly smaller — a few hundred thousand dollars on integration. Time to market 6-9 months. Break-even 12-18 months at an average take rate of 0.2-0.5%. Suitable for most telecoms that want wallet functionality without a full financial business.

Type C: lightweight payments inside the main app. Not a separate wallet product but a feature inside the telecom app: balance top-up, utility bill payment, transfers between operator subscribers, device financing. No ambition to be a “universal wallet”. Minimal capex, time to market 3-6 months. Does not produce large revenue through payment fees, but increases app frequency, retention and cross-sell. This is what most operators already have in some form.

Any wallet strategy starts with picking among these three. Without a choice — there will be a mix of all three with the worst economics of each.

When wallet is economically justified

Condition one: the operator has a retail or dealer network that can handle cash-in and cash-out. Without it, the wallet stays a digital-only product with a limited base (only customers who are already digital-native). With it, the wallet works for the cash-heavy segment as well.

Condition two: the operator does not have a long-term partnership strategy with one strong bank. If such a strategy exists, a wallet through the bank-partner is cheaper and faster. If it does not — full custody can make sense as a way to enter fintech independently.

Condition three: the operator is willing to invest in merchant acquisition. Without merchants the wallet is a P2P channel with limited economics. Merchant acquisition in Uzbekistan means competing with Click and Payme on their own ground. Each merchant signed up to a new wallet requires a value proposition stronger than “we also have a QR code”.

Condition four: leadership is ready for 18-24 months of investment before any real revenue, treating it as a long-term strategic asset, not a quick win. Wallet does not pay back fast. If the requirement is fast return — wallet is not the right answer.

If even one of these conditions is missing, the economics turn negative regardless of how well the technology is built.

When wallet becomes a trap

Scenario one. The board sees fintech as a growing business unit and wants “our own wallet”. The team launches the project without a clear answer to “why does the customer need our wallet instead of Click”. Twelve months later the wallet has tens of thousands of active users against an operator base in millions. The explanation: “we need a marketing push”. Another twelve months and the same picture, plus the realisation that merchant network is not growing. The decision is to either close or artificially subsidise. That is 18-30 lost months and a serious budget.

Scenario two. The wallet is launched as a way to compete with the bank-partner that occupies the payment provider role in the current telecom ecosystem. This breaks the partnership. The bank pulls its products. The operator’s revenue from existing integrations drops. The wallet does not catch up because of low adoption.

Scenario three. The wallet is launched in parallel with other products (super app, marketplace, loyalty) and the team splits between them. Each product gets 30-40% of the necessary attention. All three look launched, none reaches scale. On the books it looks like capitalised CapEx, on the P&L it is expense without return.

What is usually better than wallet

Bill payments hub. Utilities, taxes, fines, school fees, insurance — paid through the operator’s app. A category with predictable frequency (1-3 times per month per customer), low fees for the customer, clear economics through partnerships with service providers. The telco app becomes a utility for ongoing use.

Device financing. Smartphone instalments through the operator’s app. High ticket size, clear risk economics (if the customer does not pay — SIM is suspended), retailer partnership potential. Close to wallet functionality but in a more concrete product.

Merchant payments through the dealer network. If the operator has a wide retail network, SoftPOS or QR acquiring can be deployed across the network plus partner merchants. Less than a wallet, but the first brick if a wallet is needed later.

Bundling with an existing wallet. A partnership with Click, Payme or another — the operator sells “tariff plus wallet credit” or “cashback to wallet on top-up”. Revenue share without capex.

Decision matrix

If there is appetite to enter wallet, this matrix helps choose the type.

Condition	Type A full custody	Type B partner	Type C internal payments
Capex available	$3-5M	$300-700K	$50-150K
Time to first product	18-24 months	6-9 months	3-6 months
Retail network for cash-in	critical	desirable	not needed
Bank partnership strategy	none	yes, non-conflicting	any
Merchant acquisition strength	critical	medium	not needed
Regulatory appetite	high	medium	low
Tolerance for 18+ months to break-even	yes	conditional	not critical
Pays back at	10+ tx/mo, 30K+ merchants	6+ tx/mo, partner share	higher app frequency

Most operators in Uzbekistan fall into the Type C column by their profile. That is normal and often correct.

When not to launch at all

If the team has no head who covers fintech full-time with the authority to take P&L decisions — do not launch. Wallet does not work as a side project.

If a bilateral relationship with one strong bank is already producing significant fee revenue — do not destroy it. A partnership with the bank on a new wallet (Type B) or co-developed product can deliver the same result without conflict.

If there is no clear answer to “why does the customer move from Click or Payme to our wallet” — do not launch. This answer is mandatory. “Because we are an operator” does not work in a saturated payment market.

If the merchant strategy is not described beyond a statement like “we will sign up large retailers” — do not launch. Merchant acquisition is the most expensive part of a wallet and has to be a plan, not a wish.

If the business case does not survive a stress test of “what if adoption is 30% of plan” — do not launch. Most wallet projects get 30-50% of planned adoption in the first 18 months.

Discussion points for the committee this quarter

One question: what wallet functionality would we like to give the customer, and how much of it can we deliver via partnership or internal payments without a full wallet build? If the answer is “all of it, without a full wallet” — Type C is the answer. If the answer is “there are concrete scenarios that need full wallet” — a serious business case is needed with realistic adoption and unit economics.

Two: what are our relationships with key payment partners (Click, Payme, banks), and what will be the consequences of launching a wallet for those relationships? This often gets skipped in the discussion and surfaces later as a surprise.

Three: what frequency and merchant network do we count on by month 24 after launch, and what has to be true about the market for those numbers to be reached? If this anchor question has no realistic answers, the project is not yet mature.

How SamaraliSoft can help

Telecom Fintech Opportunity Matrix — a comparative analysis of wallet strategy types for a specific operator. The ROI of each type given current partnerships and the Uzbek payment landscape. How much of wallet functionality can be delivered through internal payments without a separate product. How to assess the conflict risk of full custody wallet with existing relationships. What has to be in a 90-180 day pilot to test adoption on real customer behaviour rather than on a presentation.

Related reading

• /en/insights/telecom-growth-after-connectivity/ — where to find growth in 2026-2035
• /en/insights/telecom-wallet-or-bills/ — wallet versus bill payments
• /en/insights/telecom-mpesa-lessons/ — lessons from M-Pesa
• /en/insights/telecom-app-monetization/ — frequency as foundation

Sources

• Central Bank of Uzbekistan — registry of payment organisations
• Central Bank of Uzbekistan — biometric verification for digital banking
• The Paypers — stricter digital banking verification, April 2026
• UzDaily — telecom market growth
• MNP.UZ — number portability